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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE
STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES: THE APPLICATION OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN BATSON V.
KENTUCKY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN H. BLUME*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some one hundred and six years before the United States
Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky' the
Court ruled that a black person is denied the equal protection of
the laws when the State seeks to convict him of a criminal of-
fense in a proceeding in which members of his race have been
excluded from serving on the jury.2 From this straightforward
and common-sense beginning, the Court stumbled and lurched
* B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; M.A.R., Yale University Di-
vinity School; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank Desa Ballard, David Bruck,
Whit Cobb, and Laughlin McDonald for their many useful comments and suggestions. I
also would like to thank Ken Wittenberg for his research assistance and Cathy Gulley for
her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson the Court held that the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution is violated when the prose-
cution in a criminal case uses its peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors be-
cause of their race.
2. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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for more than a century before arriving at another equally
straightforward and common-sense decision in Batson. The pur-
pose of this article is to examine the Supreme Court's decision
in Batson in light of both the decisions that preceded it and the
meaning given the Court's ruling by other state and federal
courts. Primarily, however, this article will focus on the first
generation of the South Carolina Supreme Court's decisions
grappling with Batson.3 After examining the state court's rul-
ings, this article will maintain that although racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection is a sensitive and difficult matter for both
trial and appellate courts, the South Carolina Supreme Court, at
least in its early decisions,4 has taken an unduly restrictive view
of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Batson. The
article will contend that the deferential analysis employed by
the South Carolina Supreme Court, for all practical purposes,
has rendered the High Court's mandate meaningless and, fur-
thermore, that such an approach is not only legally unsound but
is unwise both as a matter of policy and of court administration.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In order to enable the reader to understand Batson fully in
the context of this article, a brief discussion of the procedure
used in selecting a jury in a criminal case in South Carolina is
necessary. As in most jurisdictions, jury selection in criminal tri-
als in this state proceeds in several stages. First, a list of pro-
spective jurors is compiled from voter registration lists in the
county in which the defendant will be tried.5 Theoretically, of
3. In the interest of full disclosure, I was counsel of record for the appellant-the
losing party-in several of the cases that will be discussed in t is article.
4. The ultimate conclusions in this article are drawn fron. a relatively small num-
ber of decisions that mark the South Carolina Supreme Court's first efforts to construe
the scope of Batson. Thus, subsequent decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court
could prove the thesis of this article premature.
5. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). Legislation passed in
1988, however, which was on the November 1988 ballot as a proposed amendment to
article V, section 22 of the South Carolina Constitution changed this system somewhat.
The new method provides for the jury list to be comprised of both registered voters and
licensed drivers. The obvious purpose of the new provision is to increase the number of
persons eligible for jury service. It is common knowledge that many people do not regis-
ter to vote in order to avoid being called for jury duty.
2
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course, this group of prospective jurors represents a fair cross-
section of the community; in other words, it is comprised of per-
sons of the various racial and ethnic groups that make up the
local community.' The individuals who constitute this group, the
venire, are summoned to serve as jurors for a particular week or
term of court.' When a case is called for trial, jury selection is
conducted. The trial judge begins the process by questioning the
prospective jurors in an attempt to disclose any bias about the
case that could threaten a potential juror's impartiality. In cases
in which the State seeks the death penalty, the attorneys are
permitted to question the jurors. During this process, known as
voir dire, challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are
exercised.
Challenges for cause are unlimited in number, but may be
exercised only when the potential juror shows a strong specific
bias.' Peremptory challenges, however, do not usually require
such a showing.9 They are limited in number depending on the
6. See generally Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that Louisiana
statute, which systematically excluded women from jury service, was unconstitutional).
7. Criminal court in South Carolina is referred to as the Court of General
Sessions.
8. See S.C. CODE. ANN. § 14-7-1020 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). For example, if a
juror is closely related to the defendant, the juror would be excused for cause.
9. Historically, the peremptory challenge was intended to protect the defendant.
This type of challenge previously was referred to as "standing aside" a juror. See J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE
JURY PANELS 148 (1977). Thus, in England, from at least the year 1305, the prosecution
was required to show cause for all its challenges. A defendant, however, retained an "ar-
bitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing
any cause at all, which is called a peremptory challenge." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *353. The peremptory challenge was needed in large part to offset the government's
advantage; the sheriff of the local community personally selected the jury pool. See Note,
The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trial, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 227 (1986).
The American states accepted a defendant's peremptory challenges as part of the
common law. See J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 148-49 n.5. Some states protested the practice
of "standing aside" and denied the defendant any challenges to jurors other than for
cause, while others permitted a limited number of peremptory challenges. Congress
granted peremptory challenges to defendants in federal courts in the Act of Apr. 30,
1790, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (codified now as FED. I CRIM. P. 24), but did not mention the
prosecution's right to peremptories. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court determined
that the practice of "standing aside" was part of the common law and, hence, was the
law in the United States. See United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483
(1827). By the nineteenth century, prosecutorial peremptory challenges became common
in most states. See J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 150. In an opinion by Justice Field, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, de-
3
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crime charged. Generally, in South Carolina each side has five
peremptory strikes. In cases involving more serious crimes, how-
ever, the defendant is permitted ten challenges.10 Theoretically,
therefore, a party uses peremptory challenges as a method of ob-
taining a jury more sympathetic - or in some cases less adverse
- to its position,11 and peremptory strikes most often are used
when the attorney believes that a potential juror would not be
impartial and is unable to have the juror excused for cause. The
peremptory challenge is a subjective tool that often is utilized
based upon group stereotypes, as well as hunches and conjecture
regarding who is and who is not a fair and impartial juror. 2
In the typical criminal trial in South Carolina, the court
questions the jurors as a group in order to determine whether
any juror should be excused for cause. The potential jurors'
names then are drawn randomly. As each juror's name is called,
both the State and the defense are given an opportunity to exer-
cise a peremptory challenge. If the juror is not excused by either
side, the juror is "seated" as a member of the jury. Another po-
tential juror's name is then called, and the process is repeated
until the jury is selected.
With this understanding of the context in which peremp-
tory challenges are exercised, a look at the Court's decisions de-
lineating the constitutional implications of the State's use of its
strikes is in order.
III. HISTORICAL PROLOGUE: FROM Strauder TO Swain
It is important to examine the Supreme Court's decision in
fending it as a necessary means of securing competent and impartial jurors. See Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887). Therefore, the peremptory strike, which was origi-
nally intended to be a defendant's weapon against the government, became a system of
challenges for attaining an impartial jury for both the defense and the prosecution. See
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the
All- White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1172-73 (1966). Until the Supreme Court's Batson
decision, the peremptory challenge was used in most states by both the State and the
defense to strike potential jurors "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
10. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (designating offenses
that entitle defendant to ten peremptory strikes).
11. See J. VAN DYxE, supra note 9, at 145-47; see also R. WENKE, THE ART OF
SELECTING A JURY 46-50 (1979).
12. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-22.
[Vol. 40
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Batson v. Kentucky against the historical terrain from which it
emerged. In Strauder v. West Virginia"3 the Court first applied
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection, some twelve years after the
amendment's ratification. Strauder involved a West Virginia
statute that limited jury service to white men.14 Such blatant
discrimination on the face of a statute, the Court concluded, "is
practically a brand upon [black persons], affixed by the law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of
the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.
'15
In a number of subsequent decisions, the Court invalidated
a host of other, more subtle methods of preserving the "mono-
chromatic quality" of grand and petit juries.16 Preventing dis-
crimination in the State's use of its peremptory challenges, how-
ever, did not come quite so easily to the Court. This was so, in
part, because both prosecutors and defense counsel came to rely
on peremptory strikes to remove jurors believed to be unfavora-
ble, and the Court on several occasions noted the importance of
the peremptory challenge to the criminal justice system. 7
Nevertheless, it did not go unnoticed that prosecutors used
peremptory strikes to exclude black persons from juries, espe-
cially in cases involving black defendants and white victims." In
13. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
14. The pertinent West Virginia statute provided that "[aIll white male persons
who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve
as jurors." Id. at 305.
15. Id. at 308.
16. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (grand jury discrimination);
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (grand jury discrimination); Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (discrimination in grand jury selection); Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559 (1953) (use of different-colored tickets for black and white jurors invalidated);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (conviction and death sentence reversed because
of systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries).
17. The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the peremptory challenge is not
a constitutional requirement. The Court, however, also has maintained that the chal-
lenge always has been considered "a necessary part of trial by jury. . . [and] 'one of the
most important rights secured to the accused.'" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965)(quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
18. Defense counsel too frequently utilized racial and ethnic stereotypes in jury
selection. For example, one early trial manual indicated that Catholics are "least desira-
ble" for an insanity defense and that "[N]egroes are-generally ill-equipped to evaluate
psychiatric testimony." See G. SHADOAN, LAW AND TAcTIcs IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
1989] 303
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Swain v. Alabama the Court first grappled with - but hardly
came to grips with - this thorny problem. In Swain a black
defendant was convicted of rape in Talledega County, Alabama,
by an all-white jury.20 From 1953 to 1965, blacks comprised be-
tween ten and fifteen percent of the venires from which grand
and petit juries in Talledaga County were selected. Even so, dur-
ing that period not a single black served on a petit jury. The
jury that convicted Swain was drawn from a venire containing
eight blacks: two of these jurors were excused by the trial court
for cause, and the prosecutor struck the remaining six.2 After
the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed Swain's conviction, it
granted certiorari to consider whether "the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude negroes from serving on petit juries"22
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Justice White, writing for the majority, first praised the vir-
tues of the peremptory challenge as a means of "eliminat[ing]
extremes of impartiality"2 3 between the state and the accused.
He concluded:
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the
striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws. In the quest for an impartial and qualified
jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike sub-
ject to being challenged without cause....
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and
the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with
the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitu-
tion requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the
exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption
in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the
State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the
265-66 (1964). Clarence Darrow advised defense lawyers that it would be malpractice to
strike an Irishman, but that Baptists, Lutherans and Presbyterians should be excused if
possible. See Uleman, Striking Jurors Under Batson v. Kentucky, CRIaM. JUST., Fall 1987,
at 4.
19. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 n.25 (1986),
where the Court explained that any principles in Swain contrary to Batson were
overruled.
20. 380 U.S. at 203.
21. See id. at 204.
22. Id. at 209.
23. Id. at 219.
[Vol. 40
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case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and
the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allega-
tions that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from
the jury or that they were removed because they were
Negroes.24
In essence, the Court sanctioned the use of racial stereo-
types in the petit jury selection process. A defendant could pre-
vail under the Swain standard only by showing that the prosecu-
tor "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the
crime and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsi-
ble for the removal of [blacks] .. . selected as qualified ju-
rors. '25 Swain, therefore, required a black defendant to show not
only that the prosecutor discriminated against him in his partic-
ular case but also in previous cases against other black defend-
ants. This burden was extremely difficult to meet. Prosecutors in
Talledaga County had peremptorily challenged every single
black juror for twelve years. Yet the Swain Court did not find
this practice "systematic" enough to rebut the presumption that
the challenges were valid.26 The Swain test virtually required a
prosecutor to admit that he challenged jurors because of their
race.
The dissenting Justices in Swain maintained that even if
the record did not prove absolutely that the State systematically
had excluded black jurors, the undisputed fact that no black
person had ever served on a petit jury established a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination, which shifted the burden to the
State to provide a nonracial reason for the exclusion. 7 The dis-
sent, however, agreed with the Court's conclusion that the sys-
24. Id. at 221-22.
25. Id. at 223.
26. See id. at 224-26. Justice White based his conclusion upon the fact that the
record did not indicate when blacks had been removed by the prosection in Talladega
County, when the defense had agreed to exclude blacks from the jury, and when blacks
were removed for cause. The record, thus,:
[did] not support an inference that the prosecutor was bent on striking Ne-
groes, regardless of trial-related considerations. The fact remains, of course,
that there has not been a Negro on a jury in Talladega County since about
1950. But the responsibility of the prosecutor is not illuminated in this record.
Id. at 226.
27. See id. at 232-33 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463 (1947), and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)). Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas joined Justice Goldberg's dissent.
19891
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tematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury in a particular
case in and of itself did not overcome the presumption that the
prosecutor had not exercised his challenges in a discriminatory
manner.
28
Thus, the extremely onerous burden of proof placed upon a
defendant in Swain resulted from the Court's initial determina-
tion that the peremptory challenge was "necessary" in order to
exclude "biased" jurors. The Court apparently believed that be-
cause counsel often have inadequate information about the pre-
dispositions and hidden biases of prospective jurors, they are
forced to rely on stereotypes, common-sense judgments, and
even common prejudices in deciding whether a juror with a par-
ticular age, race, sex, religion, ethnic background, or occupation
will be impartial toward a particular defendant.29 It was this
starting point that led the Court to conclude that peremptory
strikes were properly based upon such racial generalizations. Be-
cause the burden of proof set forth by the Court in Swain was
virtually insurmountable, the Court's apparently broad commit-
ment to nondiscriminatory jury selection was not extended to
peremptory challenges. For all practical purposes, the State's
use of its peremptory challenges was not subject to the constitu-
tional limitations placed upon other state action. 0
28. The dissent stated:
(Systematic exclusion] would not mean ... that Negroes are entitled to pro-
portionate representation on a jury ... Nor would it mean that where sys-
tematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service has not been shown, a prosecu-
tor's motives are subject to question or judicial inquiry when he excludes
Negroes or any other group from sitting on a jury in a particular case.
Id. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
29. See id.
30. After Swain, numerous defendants attempted and failed to meet its rigid test
of systematic exclusion. See Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from
Jury Persons Belonging to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.31) 14 (1977). But see State v.
Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) (burden imposed by Swain was met); State v.
Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (burden imposed by Swain met). The heavy burden
imposed by Swain left minority defendants in many jurisdictions with virtually no
chance of having a member of their race on their jury. See P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL
174-76 (1984); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 9, at 166-67; Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The
Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Peremptory Challenge - Sys-
tematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967)
(authored by Gary L. Geeslin).
It is important to note that when Swain was decided, the Court had not yet incorpo-
rated the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury into the guarantees of the four-
teenth amendment. Four years after Swain, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
8
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In the years following Swain, the Court's ruling was at-
tacked increasingly by commentators 3' and lower courts.3 2 In
fact, some state courts determined that the prosecution could
not exercise its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory man-
ner pursuant to their respective state constitutions.3 3 Addition-
ally, later Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance
of representative juries, rendered the narrow holding in Swain
suspect,34 and individual Justices indicated that Swain should
the Court applied the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the
states. Subsequently, the Court held that this included the right to a petit jury pool
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. See Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Johnson, Black Innocence and the All White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611 (1985); Kuhn, supra note 30; Case Comment, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477 (1984); Comment, supra note 9; Note,
Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE
L.J. 1715, 1723 n.36 (1977).
32. Various federal courts noted that Swain virtually insulated peremptory chal-
lenges from appellate review. Furthermore, the lower courts correctly recognized a fun-
damental tension between the Court's equal protection ruling in Swain and the Court's
sixth amendment cases such as Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 22 (1975) (holding that
systematic exclusion of women from jury panels violated sixth amendment), and Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding automatic exemption from jury service upon
request for women jurors violated sixth amendment). The post-Swain sixth amendment
cases identified diversity in the jury system as a guarantee of jury impartiality. Thus, the
Second Circuit used a sixth amendment rationale for limiting the racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted and vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (remanded for reconsideration in light of
Batson v. Kentucky); see also Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (remanded for reconsideration in light of
Batson). On the other hand, other circuits rejected the sixth amendment rationale, al-
though in many cases, they still remained highly critical of Swain. See, e.g., United
States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063
(1984); United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1983). In United States v.
Leslie, 759 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1985), a panel of the Fifth Circuit, relying upon its supervi-
sory power rather than upon constitutional grounds, rejected Swain for use in federal
criminal trials. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently rejected that reasoning in
United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court ultimately
vacated that decision and remanded Leslie for reconsideration in light of Batson and
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). See 479 U.S. 1074.
33. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022-23 (1986);
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 371 Mass. 461, 387
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied sub nom. Massachusetts v. Soares, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v.
Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716
(Ct. App. 1980).
34. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975).
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be overruled.35 Therefore, it was not surprising that the Court
granted certiorari in the case of Batson v. Kentucky. 6
IV. AND THEN THERE WAS Batson
In Batson v. Kentucky the Supreme Court ostensibly ended
Swain's stranglehold on a defendant's challenge to the prosecu-
tion's discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes.37 James Kir-
kland Batson was indicted in Kentucky on charges of second-
degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. At trial, the prose-
cutor used his peremptory challenges to excuse all four prospec-
tive black jurors .3  Batson's counsel objected, maintaining that
the prosecutor had used his strikes to exclude potential black
jurors on the basis of their race. The trial judge, however, relying
upon Swain, overruled counsel's objection and stated that the
prosecution was entitled to "strike anybody [it wants] to."
'39
Batson was convicted and, on appeal to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, maintained that the Commonwealth should reject Swain
and adopt the course taken by several other jurisdictions, which
had held that the prosecutor's discriminatory use of his peremp-
tory challenges violated their respective state constitutions. °
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Batson's
claims and affirmed his conviction. 1 The United States Supreme
Court then granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the
Kentucky state courts.
35. See, e.g., Harris v. Texas, 467 U.S. 1261 (1984) (Justices Marshall and Brennan
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U.S. 981 (1984) (same dis-
senters); Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (same dissenters); McCray v. New
York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (same dissenters).
36. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
37. For other discussions of the Batson decision, see Note, Batson v. Kentucky.
The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASnNGs L. J. 1195 (1987); Note,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments - The Swain Song of the Racially Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1986); Comment,
Batson v. Kentucky: Can the 'New' Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection of
Strauder v. West Virginia?, 20 AKRoN L. REv. 355 (1986).
38. 476 U.S. at 82.
39. Id. at 82.
40. See id. at 83; see also cases cited supra note 33.
41. See 476 U.S. at 84.
308 [Vol. 40
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A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, began by
detailing the history of the Court's attempts to eradicate racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system generally and, in
jury selection, specifically. The Court also emphasized the cen-
tral role that an impartial jury plays in the criminal justice sys-
tem. In doing so, the majority recognized that discrimination in
the selection of jurors is harmful not only to the accused, but
also to the excluded juror and the entire community.42 Thus, af-
ter setting forth the various discriminatory acts found by the
Court in the past to be unlawful in the selection of juries, the
Court concluded that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will
be unable to impartially consider the State's case against a black
defendant.
43
Justice Powell, in a statement minimizing the chilling im-
pact of Swain, indicated that the principles announced in
Strauder had never been questioned, although the Court had
been called upon "to review the application of those principles
42. See id. at 87. "The petit jury has occupied a central position in our system of
justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power
by prosecutor or judge." Id. at 86. The Court also stated that jury "[s]election proce-
dures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence
in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 87.
43. Id. at 89. The Court, however, granted certiorari to consider whether the
State's use of its peremptory challenges violated the sixth amendment, not the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In fact, at oral argument, counsel for the petitioner stated that he was not relying upon
the equal protection clause or requesting the Court to overrule Swain. Id. at 113-14.
Obviously, the certiorari petition and counsel's argument must be considered against the
backdrop of the Supreme Court's and the lower federal court's decisions, which clearly
seemed to indicate that a successful challenge to the State's discriminatory use of its
strikes should be grounded in the sixth amendment, rather than the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The
Court granted certiorari in Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988), to consider whether the prosection's use of its peremptory chal-
lenges violates the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment in a case in
which a conviction was final on direct appeal at the time of the Court's Batson decision.
The Court, however, declined to reach the sixth amendment issue, instead resolving
the case on procedural grounds. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1068 (1989). The day
after Teague was decided, the Court granted certiorari in Holland v. Illinois, 109 S. Ct.
1309 (1989), to consider again the application of the "fair cross-section" requirement to
the State's use of its peremptory challenges.
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to particular facts."' 4 He then addressed the Court's prior deci-
sion in Swain, explaining the Court's earlier ruling as an at-
tempt to accommodate the peremptory challenge because of its
importance as a means of achieving a qualified and unbiased
jury.45 Then, in a curious statement, he concluded:
A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain rea-
soned that proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number
of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Since this interpretation of Swain has
placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors'
peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny. For the reasons that follow, we reject this evi-
dentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards that have
been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case
under the Equal Protection Clause.
46
After discussing a number of the Court's equal protection
cases and the principles derived from those decisions, Justice
Powell stated that those principles "support our conclusion that
a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence con-
cerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the
defendant's trial. '4 7 To establish a prima facie case, the majority
held, a defendant first must show that he is a member of a cog-
nizable racial group and that the prosecutor exercised strikes to
remove members of the defendant's race. These facts and any
other relevant circumstances - including a pattern of strikes
against black jurors in the venire - may raise a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination. The inference, if established, then
shifts the burden to the State to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging the minority jurors.48
44. 476 U.S. at 90.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 92-93 (footnotes omitted). The statement is interesting because Justice
Powell seemed to imply that the lower courts misinterpreted Swain and that the Court
never intended to require a defendant to prove the striking of blacks in case after case.
Such a revisionist history, however, is contradicted by the language and the facts of
Swain. See supra pp. 5-7. Therefore, Justice Powell's statement is best understood as
indicating that the majority was somewhat embarrassed by - and, thus, somewhat de-
fensive about - the Court's decision in Swain.
47. 476 U.S. at 96.
48. See id. at 96-97. The Court also stated that a defendant, in his effort to estab-
lish a prima facie case, was entitled to rely, on the fact that "peremptory challenges
310 [Vol. 40
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The majority made it clear that a prosecutor may not rebut
a prima facie case merely by denying that he discriminated or
because he believed that the minority jurors "would be partial to
the defendant because of their shared race. '49 Rather, the State
must articulate "a neutral explanation related to the case to be
tried."50 The trial court then is obligated to determine, based
upon all the evidence, if the defendant has established pur-
poseful racial discrimination. 1
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Swain,
concurred in Batson. He explained the change in his position as
resulting from the continued widespread use of the peremptory
challenge by prosecutors to exclude black jurors, despite Swain's
warning that the equal protection clause proscribed such pur-
poseful discrimination.52 He noted, however, that "[m]uch litiga-
tion will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's
Equal Protection holding.
'5 3
Justice Marshall also concurred. Moreover, he advocated a
more drastic remedy: the complete elimination of peremptory
challenges in criminal trials. Because he believed that the proce-
dures set forth by the majority would eliminate only the most
flagrant instances of racial discrimination, he concluded that
"[t]he inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the
jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial
grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from
the criminal justice system."'5 Because he similarly believed that
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind
to discriminate.'" Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
49. Id. at 97.
50. Id. at 98. The majority stated that "[t]he core guarantee of equal protection,
ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be
meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions,
which arise solely from the jurors' race." Id.
51. The Court specifically declined to "formulate particular procedures to be fol-
lowed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges." Id. at 99.
52. The present discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was noted also by
Justice Powell in the majority opinion. Id. at 99 ("The reality of practice, amply re-
flected in many state and federal court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and
unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors.").
53. Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1989]
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the majority opinion failed to offer any meaningful guidance for
assessing a prosecutor's motives, Justice Marshall maintained
that the constitutional safeguards promulgated by the Court to
protect minority defendants would prove to be illusory. In his
view, a prosecutor easily would be able to evade the Court's rul-
ing by articulating a permissible excuse, whether or not it was
the real reason for the challenge.55
C. The Dissents
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.56 The
Chief Justice emphasized the history and function of the pe-
remptory challenge and criticized the extension of the Court's
decisions regarding discrimination in the selection of the venire
to the State's use of its peremptory challenge.5 He believed that
"unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable'
to peremptory challenges exercised in any particular case."58 He
also believed that the majority's approach would require exten-
sion of the Batson rule to exclusions based on sex, age, religious
or political affiliations, mental capacity, number of children, liv-
ing arrangements, and employment in a particular industry or
profession.59 In addition, he expressed concern that the holding
logically could not be limited to prosecutorial abuses 0 and ulti-
mately would result in "juries that the parties do not believe are
truly impartial."6' 1
Justice Rehnquist did not believe that the Constitution bars
the State from "using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as
such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving
55. See id. at 106. Justices Stevens and O'Connor also wrote concurring opinions.
Both agreed with Justice Powell's disposition of the merits of the equal protection claim,
but wrote separately to discuss procedural aspects of the case.
56. See id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Since the petitioner failed to raise an
equal protection claim, Chief Justice Burger argued that the majority mistakenly ruled
on that issue. Because of the importance of the issue, he felt that the equal protection
decision was premature and that he, at least, would have directed reargument of the
issue. Id. at 134 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 112.
58. Id. at 123.
59. See id. at 124.
60. See id. at 125-26.
61. Id. at 129.
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white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defend-
ants. . . and so on."'62 Because the excluded blacks are not de-
nied the right to serve as jurors in cases involving nonblack de-
fendants, he argued, neither the excluded blacks nor the
community is harmed. Thus, in his view, there is nothing uncon-
stitutional in the State's exercise of peremptory challenges based
on group affiliations or racial classification because the very pur-
pose of the peremptory challenge is to provide a method for each
side to obtain what it believes to be an unbiased jury.
3
In summary, Batson marked a clear departure from Swain
in that the Court held not only that the State violated the four-
teenth amendment by purposefully excluding minority jurors
from serving on a minority defendant's jury, but also that a de-
fendant could establish purposeful discrimination based solely
upon the facts of his case. The ruling, grounded in the Court's
prior equal protection and antidiscrimination decisions, also set
forth a basic framework for trial and appellate courts to use in
evaluating claims of purposeful discrimination in jury selection.
For many jurisdictions, including South Carolina, Batson
presented the courts with a new challenge.
V. FILLING IN THE PIECES: Batson IN CONTEXT
A. Basic Equal Protection Principles
The Supreme Court's ruling in Batson must be examined in
light of its prior antidiscrimination decisions. The equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment64 prohibits governmen-
tal acts that either burden rights or deny benefits because of ar-
bitrary classifications.6 5 More significantly for the purposes of
this discussion, any classification based upon race or national or-
igin is considered "suspect" and will be upheld only if the classi-
62. Id. at 137-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 137-39.
64. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides in relevant
part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAW 521-801 (3d abr.
ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. NOWAK]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1028
(1977). The equal protection clause does not prohibit the government from classifying
persons. Rather it prohibits classifications based upon impermissible criteria or which
arbitrarily burden a group of individuals. J. NOWAK, supra, at 525.
3131989]
15
Blume: Racial Discrimination in the State's Use of Peremptory Challenges
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fication is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.6
The most difficult part of challenging governmental action
as racially discriminatory is proving that a law is being applied
differently to particular groups by classifying members accord-
ing to a "suspect" or racial trait.17 Because of this difficulty, the
Supreme Court has recognized that statistical proof is relevant
in determining whether unlawful racial discrimination is pre-
sent. 8 Thus, statistical evidence showing a disproportionate im-
pact on a minority racial group may be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination. Because
the criteria used for selecting the jury pool often is subjective,
statistical evidence frequently has been used, and accepted, in
jury selection cases.70 Jury selection procedures at the jury pool
stage have been found to violate the equal protection clause
when the statistics revealed racially disproportionate results or
when the statistics indicated that the selectors were using their
discretion in a racially discriminatory manner.7
The Court also has made clear that an individual challeng-
ing racially discriminatory state action must demonstrate that
the action was conducted with a discriminatory purpose.7 2 In or-
der to make this determination, a reviewing court must under-
take an inquiry "into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available. '7 3 Furthermore, the Court has held
that relevant circumstantial evidence includes evidence of ra-
cially discriminatory impact. In fact, the Court has recognized
that in some cases the proof of discriminatory impact "may for
66. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also J. NOWAK, supra note
65, at 530.
67. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (law that is facially neutral but is
applied in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race or national origin violates the
equal protection clause).
68. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988); Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(Court accepted that statistics indicated racial discrimination in the application of Geor-
gia's death penalty statute, but nevertheless denied relief).
69. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
70. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
71. See id.
72. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
73. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1979); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (considered past discrimi-
nation in employment in local community and all other evidence indicating discrimina-
tory intent in evaluating claim of voting discrimination).
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all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because
in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds." 4
B. The Relevance of the Court's Title VII Decisions
The majority opinion in Batson also drew on the Court's
prior decisions construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 5 which prohibits discrimination in employment based
upon an individual's race or national origin. 6 The Court's Title
VII decisions have articulated more clearly than have its equal
protection decisions the role of the prima facie case and the as-
sociated shifting burdens.17 In those cases, the Court determined
that the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating a
prima facie case of discrimination.78 The prima facie case means,
in essence, that a presumption is established that the plaintiff's
employer unlawfully discriminated against him. 9 Once a prima
facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the defend-
ant, the employer, to prove a "legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason"80 for the adverse action. If the defendant comes forward
with a nondiscriminatory reason, then the plaintiff must be
given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the race-
neutral reason is a pretext and not the true reason for the de-
fendant's action.81 The Court has recognized that a plaintiff may
prove that the defendant's actions were pretextual by showing
that similarly situated persons of another race were treated
differently.
82
74. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242. For example, the Court has held that the total or
seriously disproportionate exclusion of black persons from jury venires is sufficient to
prove intentional discrimination. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945).
75. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
76. See 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, 98 n.21.
77. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
78. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
79. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714.
80. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
81. See id. at 256.
82. See id. at 258. In McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the
Court held that the "criterion [articulated by the defendant must be] applied alike to
members of all races." Id. at 804. Other relevant evidence of pretext includes the defend-
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C. Racial Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System
Batson also must be examined in light of the Court's deci-
sion - many of which have been discussed previously in this
article - specifically dealing with racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system. In these cases, many if not most of
which involve discrimination in the jury selection process, s the
Court has recognized not only the potential for, but the reality
of, racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. 4 Fur-
thermore, the Court has recognized that "[dliscrimination on
the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in
the administration of justice. . . . [It] destroys the appearance
of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process."' 5 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
more subjective or discretionary the methods and practices in-
volved in a particular case, the greater the potential for racial
discrimination and abuse."'
VI. A HOSTILE AUDIENCE: THE DECISIONS OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CONSTRUING Batson
In State v. Smith the South Carolina Supreme Court first
addressed the merits of a claim that the prosecution exercised
its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.8 7
ant's general policy and practice towards minorities. Id. at 804-05.
83. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 99; Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979)
("[R]acial ... discrimination still remain[s] a fact of life, in the administration of justice
as in our society as a whole.").
85. Rose, 443 U.S. at 555-56. The Court in Rose also noted that discrimination in
jury selection "strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society as
a whole." Id. at 556. See also Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771 (1988) (purposeful racial
discrimination in drawing up master jury lists).
86. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 27 (1986) (because wide range of discretion is
entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is heightened opportunity for
racial prejudice to enter into the sentencer's calculus); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,
562 (1953) (Georgia jury selection practice of having different colored tickets for black
and white jurors "makes it easier for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate"); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (peremptory challenge is a device that, because of
its subjective nature, is highly susceptible to discriminatory use).
87. 293 S.C. 22, 358 S.E.2d 389 (1987). The court previously had encountered a
Batson claim in State v. Hawkins, 289 S.C. 482, 347 S.E.2d 98 (1986). In Hawkins the
court did not reach the merits of the appellant's contentions, as it determined that Bat-
son should be given only prospective application and, therefore, did not apply to crimi-
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In Smith the State utilized two of its five peremptory challenges
against prospective black jurors. The solicitor did not exercise
his other three strikes, and four black persons were seated. 8
Smith's trial counsel objected and maintained that the State had
excused the jurors because of their race. The trial judge deter-
mined that Smith had failed to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in jury selection. Based upon these facts,
the supreme court determined that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in ruling that a prima facie case had not been es-
tablished."9 In so ruling, the court noted that "the trial court
must examine all relevant circumstances in determining whether
a defendant has shown a prima facie case of purposeful discrim-
ination in the State's exercise of its peremptory strikes."90
State v. Jones9' marked the South Carolina Supreme
Court's first effort to articulate procedures necessary to imple-
ment the Supreme Court's mandate in Batson. After criticizing
the High Court's "vague guidelines," the state court determined
that "the better course to follow would be to hold a Batson hear-
ing on the defendant's request whenever the defendant is a
member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor exer-
cises peremptory challenges to remove members of defendant's
race from the venire." 92 Such a procedure, the court reasoned,
would remove any doubt about when a Batson hearing should be
conducted and would ensure a complete record for appellate re-
view. 3 Thus, pursuant to the state procedure set forth in Jones,
the trial judge should conduct a hearing to determine whether
the prosecution violated Batson v. Kentucky whenever:
(1)the defendant requests such a hearing;
(2) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group;
and
nal trials conducted before the decision was rendered on April 30, 1986. Hawkins, how-
ever, was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that Batson applied to all cases not yet final
on direct appeal at the time of the Court's decision). Cf. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255
(1986) (Batson does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct appeal at the
time of the Court's decision).
88. See 293 S.C. at 23, 358 S.E.2d at 390.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
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(3) the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to re-
move members of the defendant's race from the venire.'
The court also set forth the point at which counsel must
object to the State's use of its strikes. Pursuant to Jones, coun-
sel must object and request a hearing after the jury is selected,
but before it is sworn. 5 The hearing, at which the prosecutor is
required to articulate his reasons for challenging minority jurors,
should be conducted outside the presence both of the venire and
the selected jurors.8 6 If the trial judge determines that the de-
fendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful racial
discrimination and that the State has failed to rebut the prima
facie case, then the jury selection procedure must be conducted
once more.9 7 Because Jones' trial was not conducted in conform-
ity with the South Carolina Supreme Court's newly articulated
guidelines, the case was remanded for further proceedings."
In State v. Lewis 9 the State exercised three of its strikes
against prospective black jurors and one against an alternate
black juror. As a result of the State's use of its challenges, Lewis
was tried and convicted of murder by an all-white jury. On ap-
peal, however, she maintained that only one of the State's pe-
remptory challenges was racially discriminatory and, thus, inva-
lid. The articulated reason given by the State for excusing the
challenged juror was that during voir dire he had indicated that
he knew one of Lewis' attorneys. 100 The court held that to rebut
a prima facie case under Batson, the State "must 'articulate a
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried.' ,,0o The court made clear, however, that the State's rea-
son need not rise to the level needed to justify a challenge for
cause. Applying those principles to Lewis' case, the court con-
94. Id. at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. The court stated that in large counties it would be possible to select an entirely
new jury from the remaining members of the venire. Id. at 58 n.3, 358 S.E.2d at 704 n.3.
In other counties, however, when there are not sufficient remaining persons in the venire
to select a new jury, the venire will have to be "reconstructed" with both the challenged
jurors and the jurors actually selected being placed back into the jury pool. Id.
98. See id. at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
99. 293 S.C. 107, 359 S.E.2d 66 (1987).
100. See id. at 111, 359 S.E.2d. at 68.
101. Id. at 112, 359 S.E.2d at 68 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
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cluded that because the reason given by the State was "founded
upon evidence in the record and [was] racially neutral," the dic-
tates of Batson had been satisfied. °2
In State v. Martinez10 3 the court sharply divided over
whether the State had used its peremptory challenges in a dis-
criminatory manner. At Martinez's trial, the State excused four
of the five black jurors presented. The trial court found that the
defendant had established a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination and required the prosecutor to set forth his reasons
for excusing the minority jurors.104 The State's articulated race-
neutral reasons were as follows: (1) Juror Johnson - worked for
the State Department of Mental Health; (2) Juror Smith - was
chronically unemployed; and (3) Jurors Wilson and Salley - were
of the same sex and age group as Martinez and had "possible"
criminal records.105 The trial judge determined that although the
State's articulated reasons were not good reasons, they were not
racially discriminatory. He ruled, therefore, that the State suffi-
ciently had rebutted the prima facie case. 0 6 A three-judge ma-
jority of the supreme court affirmed. In doing so, the majority
stated, "Batson requires only a racially neutral explanation that
need not rise to the level of justification of a challenge for cause.
We find the reasons stated are sufficient.' 0
7
Justices Ness and Finney dissented. Both were convinced
that the State had failed to rebut the prima facie case. Chief
Justice Ness concluded that the State's supposed race-neutral
reasons were inadequate not only because the prosecutor did not
apply the reasons to exclude prospective white jurors, but also
because one of the reasons, that the juror had a "possible crimi-
102. Id.
103. 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641 (1987).
104. See id. at 73, 362 S.E.2d at 642.
105. See id.
106. See Record at 7-10.
107. 294 S.C. at 73, 362 S.E.2d at 642 (citations omitted). The court also stated:
Appellant complains the Solicitor's use of age as an explanation is insufficient
because he did not strike whites of the same age group. This argument ignores
the fact that both Juror Wilson and Juror Salley were noted as having possible
criminal records. Appellant also complains unemployment is insufficient as a
racially neutral explanation because there is a disproportionate amount of un-
employment among blacks. We reject this argument.
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nal record," rested on nothing more than speculation."' 8 In the
course of his dissenting opinion, Justice Ness made the following
evocative comment:
Members of this Court have informally voiced their disagree-
ment with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bat-
son v. Kentucky. The Court should not be permitted, however,
to circumvent the mandates of that decision by accepting any
and all explanations offered by solicitors for use of peremptory
challenges, however weak they may be. "'Rubber stamp' ap-
proval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical
or fanciful, would cripple Batson's commitment to 'ensure that
no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his
race.'"
My dissent in this opinion should not be interpreted as a
philosophical disagreement with the other members of this
court on the logic of the Batson holding; rather it should be
seen only as a realization that the decision is binding on this
court.10"
The most recent decision of the court involving a claim of
alleged discrimination in jury selection is State v. Howard."0 In
Howard appellants objected to the State's striking of eight of
nine potential black jurors."' The trial judge determined that a
prima facie case of discrimination had been established and re-
quired the prosecutor to set forth his reasons for excusing the
minority jurors. Based upon the prosecutor's articulated reasons,
the lower court concluded that the State had successfully rebut-
ted the prima facie case. The majority addressed the appellants'
108. Id. at 76, 362 S.E.2d at 643 (Ness, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Ness only
addressed the reasons offered for excluding juror Wilson. Because the reasons given for
striking this juror were inadequate, he did not believe it necessary to examine the other
reasons articulated for excusing the other minority jurors. Id. His conclusion regarding
juror Wilson was supported by the record. The trial judge questioned the prosecutor
about the basis for his statement that the juror was excluded because of a possible crimi-
nal record, and the State produced no evidence. Additionally, the State accepted five
white jurors who were similar in age to Martinez.
109. Id. at 76-77, 362 S.E.2d at 643-44) (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987)). Justice Finney dissented, stating, "Being of the opinion that the
reasons set forth by the solicitor are insufficient to establish a racially neutral explana-
tion and, further, the articulated reasons are contradicted in the record, I concur in the
result reached in the dissent." Id. at 77, 362 S.E.2d at 644 (Finney, J., dissenting).
110. - S.C. -, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988).
111. Id. at ., 369 S.E.2d at 139. Howard was tried along with a codefendant, Dana
Weldon. Thus, the State was permitted ten peremptory challenges.
[Vol. 40
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss2/2
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
contention in a perfunctory manner, concluding that the prose-
cutor indicated that he excused the jurors based upon their
"perceived attitudes to the death penalty" and that on the basis
of the "record before us, we are satisfied that the trial judge's




Justice Finney again dissented. In a much more detailed
and factually specific analysis than that employed by the major-
ity, he addressed the reasons offered by the State" 3 and deter-
mined that the State's supposed nonracial reasons had not been
applied equally to prospective white jurors. Thus, Justice Finney
concluded that the State had failed to rebut the prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination. In his opinion he noted:
It is most unfortunate that the majority concludes that the so-
licitor rebutted appellant's prima facie case in the face of a rec-
ord which contradicts the state's articulated position. The affir-
mation of this case effectively undermines appellant's right to
an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross section of
the community. The majority's willingness to allow the state to
prevail upon such blatantly inconsistent standards for its pe-
remptory challenges leaves Batson and Jones without sub-
stance. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641
(1987) (Ness, C.J., dissenting). A prosecutor is required to show
that he challenged similarly situated members of the majority
group on identical or comparable grounds as members of the
minority group. Compliance with this requirement establishes
consistency in Batson hearings and provides a systematic
means of determining bona fide neutral reasons for peremptory
challenges. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387
N.E.2d 499 (1979). See also, State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508,
511 A.2d 1150, 1168 (1986) (prosecutor's failure to challenge
White jurors who did not nieet his asserted criteria is highly
probative in determining whether the prima facie case had
been rebutted). Such consistency in the record would signifi-
112. Id. at -, 369 S.E.2d at 134.
113. As Justice Finney pointed out, the majority opinion greatly oversimplified mat-
ters. Not all the jurors were challenged because of their views regarding the death pen-
alty. Other reasons offered by the State for excusing several of the jurors, in addition to
their views regarding the death penalty, were as follows: several were "young," ages
twenty and twenty-three; one juror had an erratic work history; another's spouse was
unemployed. As the dissent pointed out, however, none of these reasons were applied to
similarly situated white jurors who were young, reluctant to impose the death penalty, or
had unstable work histories. Id. at _ 369 S.E.2d at 139-40.
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cantly curtail appellate review of this issue and insure the pres-
ervation of an accused's right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury.1
24
VII. A COMPARISON WITH THE PAST: A HISTORICAL LOOK AT
THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S PRE-Batson DECISIONS
In order to place the South Carolina Supreme Court's post-
Batson v. Kentucky cases in proper perspective, it is instructive
to review briefly the court's prior decisions involving claims of
racial discrimination in jury selection. These decisions, both
prior to and after Swain v. Alabama, reflect a judicial reluctance
to find discrimination. State v. Grant115 involved the appeal of a
young black man sentenced to death by an all-white jury in
Berkeley County for the crime of the assault with intent to rav-
ish - the attempted rape - of a young white woman. At trial
and on appeal, Grant maintained that black persons had been
excluded from both the grand jury that indicted him and the
petit jury that convicted him. At the time of Grant's trial, only
one black person was registered to vote and was thus eligible to
be chosen as a juror in Berkeley County, even though black per-
sons outnumbered whites in the general population. The court,
therefore, concluded that because there was no evidence that
"[any] colored person was refused registration" and because
there was no evidence that black persons had been deterred
from registering, Grant's claim was meritless. 116 Subsequently,
Grant was executed.
Four years later in State v. Middleton,'1 the court was
faced with a similar claim. The appellant maintained that black
persons had been excluded from his petit jury, primarily because
minority jurors were not able to pay the poll tax of $300. Mid-
dleton was tried and convicted in Charleston County for the
crime of assault with intent to ravish a white woman. At the
time of his trial, fewer than five percent of the registered voters
114. Id. at -, 369 S.E.2d at 139-40 (Finney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
115. 199 S.C. 412, 19 S.E.2d 638 (1941).
116. See id. at 435, 19 S.E.2d at 648. The court also noted that the one black regis-
tered voter was listed in the registration books as "Reverend" and, thus, was entitled to
a statutory exemption in any event. Id. at 435, 19 S.E.2d at 647-48.
117. 207 S.C. 478, 36 S.E.2d 742 (1946).
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in the country were black, and approximately 100 of the 3,400
persons in the jury box from which appellant's jury was drawn
were black persons. None of the individuals drawn to serve on
the jury in the term of court in which Middleton was tried were
black persons. The court dealt with appellant's claims in great
detail, maintaining that the claim had absolutely no evidentiary
basis, and set forth the manner in which the system operated. As
is true today, both the grand and the petit jury venires were se-
lected from the list of registered voters. The court concluded
that "[tihere is no evidence in this case that any Negro any-
where in the State has ever applied and been refused registra-
tion [to vote] if he can both read and write or owns $300.00
worth of property."118 Furthermore, the court concluded that
there was nothing discriminatory about the fact that a "c" was
placed by the name of black persons in the registration lists.
The court then stated that Middleton's contention was nothing
more than an effort to "impugn the motive and conduct of the
Courts of this State" 1 9 because:
[t]he State of South Carolina is not recreant nor recalcitrant in
following the Federal laws in the selection of a jury, and in re-
quiring that Negroes be drawn to sit as jurors and that their
names be included with others in the jury box. If no negroes
are drawn at any term of Court it is merely incidental to the
usual and customary method of presenting the names of jurors
for each week. 120
Similarly, in State v. Fleming'2' the court again rejected a
claim alleging the systematic exclusion of black persons from the
grand and petit juries. Fleming was tried in Clarendon County,
which, at the time of his trial, was approximately sixty percent
black.122 The evidence revealed that, at least from 1935 to 1962,
no black person had ever served on either a grand or petit jury
in the county, although several blacks had been called for jury
service after 1962.123 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
fact that only thirty-five black persons were registered to vote
118. Id. at 488, 36 S.E.2d at 746.
119. Id. at 486, 36 S.E.2d at 745.
120. Id. at 491, 36 S.E.2d at 747.
121. 243 S.C. 265, 133 S.E.2d 800 (1963).
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"refutes any contrary inference which might be drawn from the
relatively small number of Negro jurors, should only population
figures be considered.
1 24
In Bostick v. State125 the court again denied a systematic
exclusion claim because blacks had not been excluded totally
from the jury selection process. One black person had been on
the grand jury that indicted Bostick; two others were in the ve-
nire - although neither was called or seated - from which the
jury that convicted him and sentenced him to death was drawn.
The court also credited the testimony of responsible officials
who had stated that there had been no systematic exclusion of
black persons from jury service in Jasper County.1 26 The state
court's decision subsequently was reversed and remanded for re-
consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Whitus
v. Georgia.
1 27
Despite the court's protestations and denials, the fact that
black persons comprised such a small percentage of the regis-
tered voters - and, thus, were excluded from jury service -
resulted in their wholesale disfranchisement in South Caro-
lina. 28 Black persons were refused voter registration through a
combination of both objective barriers, such as the poll tax and
literacy tests, and through internalized fear and hostility.1 29 Ad-
ditionally, party rules prevented even the black persons who did
register from voting in the Democratic primary. Because the Re-
124. Id. at 270-71, 133 S.E.2d at 803; see also Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 491, 186
S.E.2d 516 (1970) (post-Swain decision involving black man sentenced to death for the
rape of a white woman, holding that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because of flaws in the statistics presented), sentence vacated 403 U.S.
948 (1971); Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713 (jury discrimination claim de-
nied in case involving black man sentenced to death for the rape of a white woman in
Dorchester County), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 860 (1964).
125. 247 S.C. 22, 145 S.E.2d 439 (1965), rev'd, 386 U.S.
479 (1967).
126. See id. at 28, 145 S.E.2d at 442.
127, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (finding discrimination in Georgia under similar
circumstances).
128. See McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disfranchisement of Blacks in
South Carolina, 37 S.C.L. REv. 557 (1986).
129. In addition to poll taxes and literacy tests, South Carolina law provided that an
individual was not qualified to vote if he had been convicted of certain crimes. The dis-
franchising offenses were crimes that blacks were thought more likely to commit than
whites, such as larceny, adultery, fornication, incest, and wife beating. On the other
hand, crimes such as murder and fighting, which were thought to be committed more
often by whites, did not result in disfranchisement. See id. at 571.
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publican party was virtually nonexistent in South Carolina at
that time, the Democratic primary was, for many years, the only
election that mattered.' This also significantly depressed black
voter registration. 1'3 Thus, the dearth of black persons called for
jury service did not result from a lack of desire among black per-
sons to register to vote or to serve on juries, but rather from
intentional discrimination by state and local officials.132 Further-
more, even the few black persons who were registered seldom
were called for jury service, and the ones who were included in
the jury pool rarely, if ever, ended up being seated as a juror.
Certainly, letter the "c" for "colored" placed beside their names
in the jury commissioners' lists contributed to the continued ab-
sence of black persons from jury service.
State v. Waitus133 is the only case in which the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court granted relief because of the exclusion of
blacks from jury service. The court did so reluctantly, however,
stating that "[w]e are bound by [the Supreme Court's] decisions
construing the Federal Constitution, although our own views
may not be in accord therewith.' ' 3 4 In Waitus the court was
confronted with an appeal from Marion County. Even though
ten percent of the registered voters were black, the evidence re-
vealed that "for a period of at least twelve years, no Negro has
ever sat on either the grand or the petit jury in Marion
County."'3 5 The court noted that even though it was "quite sure
that there was no evil intent or conscious disregard of duty by
130. Id. at 572. Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944), holding that the Texas "white primary" was unconstitutional, blacks
still were prevented from voting by party rules in South Carolina.
131. The literacy tests were used by officials to prevent even those blacks who could
read from registering. Additionally, a number of tactics, such as closing the voter regis-
tration office when blacks came to register, were utilized even after many of the legal
barriers to voter registration were invalidated in the middle decades of this century. See
McDonald, supra note 128, at 572.
132. Civil actions alleging jury discrimination were filed in many counties in South
Carolina. Almost all were settled by consent decrees, entered into by the parties, which
changed the methods for selecting juries in order to ensure black participation.
133. 224 S.C. 12, 77 S.E.2d 256 (1953).
134. Id. at 19, 77 S.E.2d at 259. The court also noted later in its opinion that
"whatever may be the individual opinions of the members of this court as to the correct-
ness, soundness, or wisdom of these decisions, it becomes our duty to yield thereto." Id.
at 23, 77 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Crumb v. State, 205 Ga. 547, 552, 54 S.E.2d 639, 641
(1949)).
135. Id. at 21, 77 S.E.2d at 260.
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the jury commissioners," relief had to be granted because of the
Supreme Court's jury discrimination decisions.
1 3
The final pre-Batson case in which a claim of this nature
was decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court was State v.
Truesdale.'37 Truesdale's counsel made a pretrial motion to pre-
vent the State from excluding potential jurors on account of
their race. In support of the motion, counsel presented a statisti-
cal study indicating a pattern of strikes against black jurors in
Lancaster County. Both the trial and appellate courts rejected
the statistical showing.1 38 The court also stated, however, that
the trial court did not even have to entertain Truesdale's "bi-
zarre request" to limit the State's discriminatory use of its pe-
remptory challenges because "it assumed a power in the courts
of this State which does not exist." '39 Relying on Swain, the
court stated that a peremptory challenge may be exercised for
any reason at all and that "[tihe constitutionality of peremptory
challenges as well as their role in the judicial process are now
well settled."1
4 0
Of course, most of the decisions discussed in this section of
the article were decided in a different era. Yet in most of the
cases, the court reached its decision despite knowledge that
black persons were intentionally prevented from registering to
vote and, thus, from serving on juries and that discrimination
against blacks in jury selection was pervasive. Today, when such
blatant discrimination largely has been eradicated and lives no
longer hang in the balance, almost everyone is willing to admit
that the discrimination vehemently denied by prosecutors and
judges at that time, was very real.'41 The language and tone of
136. See id. The apparent test for demonstrating that black persons had been dis-
criminated against in the jury selection process propounded by the court in Waitus, and
referred to in several of the other decisions discussed previously in this section, was the
complete and total exclusion of all black persons from serving on both grand and petit
juries.
137. 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528 (1982).
138. See id. at 374, 296 S.E.2d at 531-32.
139. Id. at 373, 296 S.E.2d at 531.
140. Id. (citing Swain, 380 U.S. 202).
141. The same is true of other historic discrimination in the criminal justice system.
For example, it is acknowledged now that the death penalty for rape and attempted rape
was reserved almost exclusively for those cases in which the accused was a black male
and the victim was a white female. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 199 S.C. 412, 19 S.E.2d 638
(1941). The racially discriminatory manner in which the death penalty was meted out
was one of the Supreme Court's primary unmentioned concerns in Coker v. Georgia, 433
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the recent decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court con-
struing Batson is not only similar to that of the prior decisions
sanctioning the exclusion of blacks from jury service,14 2 but it is
fundamentally at odds with the spirit of Batson.
VIII. FROM THE CRITIC'S CORNER: RECOGNIZING THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
SUPREME COURT
A review of the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinions
construing Batson v. Kentucky leaves little doubt that the deci-
sion is one with which the court does not agree in principle and
finds difficult to administer. 4" In part, the court's criticism is
well taken. The Batson holding is in fact "skeletal," as the High
Court specifically declined to articulate "particular procedures
to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecu-
tor's challenges.' 1 44 Thus, the state court's criticism of Batson's
"vague guidelines" is not without substance.145 Furthermore, it
is true that the United States Supreme Court's decision left
many questions unanswered. 146 It is also true that an appellate
court may have difficulty discerning a prosecutor's motives from
a "cold record." Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme
U.S. 584 (1977), in which the Court held that capital punishment could not be imposed
for the crime of rape. Nevertheless, although now commonly acknowledged, racial dis-
crimination previously was denied strenuously by all states that imposed the death pen-
alty in rape cases, almost all of which were former slave states.
142. Compare State v. Waltus, 224 S.C. 12, 77 S.E.2d 256 (1953) and State v. Grant,
199 S.C. 412, 19 S.E.2d 638 (1941) with State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641
(1987) and State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987). The South Carolina Su-
preme Court's treatment of Batson also is surprising in light of the court's zealous pro-
tection of other constitutional rights guaranteed to an individual accused of a crime. See,
e.g., State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 365 S.E.2d 22 (1988) (involving fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986)
(also involving fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
143. See supra pp. 21-22.
144. 476 U.S. at 99. The Supreme Court's reluctance to mandate more specific pro-
cedures apparently was due to "the variety of jury selection practices followed in our
state and federal trial courts." Id. at 99 n.24.
145. See State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 57, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1987).
146. For example, the Court did not decide whether a defendant is prohibited from
discriminating against minority jurors in the use of his or her peremptory challenges -
although the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in an unpublished memorandum
opinion that it does not - or whether a defendant had to be black to object to the
State's striking black jurors.
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Court's reluctance to enforce Batson zealously is unwise.
South Carolina, like almost every other jurisdiction - espe-
cially our sister southern states - now is faced with the first
generation of Batson claims. The court's decisions make clear
that it is divided over the scope of the ruling in Batson. Chief
Justice Ness' dissent in Martinez exposes the majority's unhap-
piness with the Batson holding. Yet even without the statements
contained in the Martinez dissent, the narrowness of the state
court's interpretation of the Batson is readily apparent. The
early decisions previously outlined in this article reveal that if a
prosecutor has the presence of mind to offer any reason for the
use of a peremptory challenge - as long as it is not race -
regardless of whether it is supported by the record, plausible on
its face or applied to similarly situated white jurors, the court
will not disturb a trial court's finding that the strike was legiti-
mate. 1 7 Of course, after Batson and the decisions of the South
Carolina Supreme Court, only in the rarest of circumstances
would a prosecutor admit that he or she struck black jurors be-
cause of their race. Thus, for all practical purposes, the supreme
court's extreme deference to the trial judge's ruling on a Batson
claim insulates the trial court's determination from meaningful
appellate review. It remains to be seen, however, whether South
Carolina's reluctance to enforce Batson rigorously will withstand
federal review. It cannot be seriously contended that the Su-
preme Court intended or will ultimately permit Batson to be so
easily evaded. Such an interpretation of Batson, if accepted by
the Court, in effect would mean that the insurmountable burden
of Swain remains in force in all but the most unusual circum-
stances. It is doubtful whether that was the Court's intent.
Therefore, there is a substantial likelihood that if the South
Carolina Supreme Court persists in its extremely narrow inter-
pretation of Batson, its approach will be rejected at some point
by the federal courts in federal habeas corpus proceedings." 8
147. See, e.g., State v. Howard, - S.C. -, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988); State v. Marti-
nez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641 (1987).
148. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tompkins v. State, No.
68,870 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Tompkins v. Texas, 108
S. Ct. 1727, cert. amended, 108 S. Ct. 2818 (1988), to review a decision of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals - another court that has interpreted Batson very narrowly
- which held that Batson was not violated when the prosecutor used all his challenges
to exclude minority jurors and both the trial appellate courts accepted his articulated
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Additionally, the state court's treatment of Batson claims
sends the wrong message to prosecutors and trial judges. If trial
judges and prosecutors understand that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court will not hesitate to reverse a criminal conviction
when the record reveals that the State has exercised its peremp-
tory challenges in a discriminatory manner, then the court's re-
view function eventually will become much easier. Prosecutors
will accept the fact that their strikes cannot be used to exclude
minority jurors without valid specific reasons related to the case
to be tried. Trial judges will carefully scrutinize a prosecutor's
articulated race-neutral reasons for excusing minority jurors and
require the jury selection process to be conducted again if the
reasons are not adequate. Thus, the appellate court will not be
faced with as many difficult problems in attempting to discern a
solicitor's motives on the basis of the trial transcript. Although
South Carolina is not alone in its narrow interpretation of Bat-
son,149 many states have embraced Batson more warmly. Conse-
quently, if the South Carolina Supreme Court were to enforce
Batson rigorously, it would be following the course adopted by
several other states, which have set forth more detailed proce-
dures for trial courts to use in evaluating Batson claims. These
courts have reversed a defendant's conviction when the record
reveals purposeful discrimination in the State's use of its pe-
remptory strikes. 150
A. A Comparison of the South Carolina Approach With
That of Other States
As has been set forth previously, Batson allows a defendant
to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
solely on evidence derived from his case. He first must show that
he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prose-
cutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove members
of his race from the venire. If a prima facie case is established,
then the State is required to articulate a race-neutral reason for
reasons for the strikes.
149. See, e.g., State v. Crump, 747 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting that
Batson applies only if black defendant is tried before an all-white jury).
150. Additionally, as was noted previously in this article, a number of states pro-
scribed the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges even before the Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky. See supra note 33.
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the challenges. The guidelines set forth by the South Carolina
Supreme Court about when a trial court should require the pros-
ecution to state the reasons for its strikes are sound. In State v.
Jones'51 the court wisely determined that a hearing should be
conducted at the defendant's request, at which the solicitor is
required to set forth his reasons for his peremptory challenges
"whenever the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial
group and the prosecutor exercises peremptory challenges to re-
move members of the defendant's race from the venire." ''
Although the opinion did not articulate this point clearly,
the logic of Jones is that a prima facie case may be established
on minimal evidence. This is as it should be. Such a bright-line
test ensures the development of the record for appellate review
and simplifies the task of the trial court. As other courts have
recognized, it is imperative that the trial judge find a prima facie
showing on a minimal showing of discrimination. To do other-
wise would foreclose reasonable inquiry into the defendant's
claims and possibly "immunize" a single invidious act.153
Once a prima facie case is established, a prosecutor must
"articulate a neutral explanation" 154 that is "clear and reasona-
bly specific" and "legitimate.' 1 55 Batson teaches that the prose-
cutor may not rebut the prima facie showing if his justifications
are merely "sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting
acts of group discrimination.' ' 5 The decisions of the South Car-
olina Supreme Court, however, indicate that a prosecutor must
do very little to rebut the prima facie case. Apparently, any rea-
son, as long as it is not overtly racial, will suffice.157 The most
serious defect in the South Carolina Supreme Court's approach
is its apparent unwillingness to require the prosecution to apply
151. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
152. Id. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 473, 387 N.E.2d 499, 508,
cert. denied sub nom. Massachusetts v. Soares, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Batson is violated if
the State excuses a single minority juror for racially discriminating reasons. See United
States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986); Powell v. State, 182 Ga. App. 123, 355
S.E.2d 72 (1987). Contra Crump, 747 S.W.2d 193.
154. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
155. Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 258 (1981)).
156. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
906 (1978).
157. See supra p. 319.
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its purported race-neutral reasons to prospective white jurors. In
evaluating a prosecutor's effort to rebut a prima facie showing,
various courts correctly have realized that one very relevant con-
sideration is whether the prosecutor challenged similarly situ-
ated white jurors on identical or comparable grounds.158 For ex-
ample, in Gamble v. State1 59 the Georgia Supreme Court
determined that a solicitor's articulated reason was legally inad-
equate to rebut the defendant's prima facie showing of discrimi-
nation. The solicitor claimed to have excused a black juror be-
cause of his age, but the court rejected that reason because white
jurors in the same age group were not challenged.160 The South
Carolina Supreme Court, however, has declined to adopt this ap-
proach and has found that the prosecutor's reason was "race
neutral" even when the State did not also challenge similarly
situated white jurors.161 Such a comparison is necessary, how-
ever, because a prosecutor's purported race-neutral reason is
more likely to have been a pretext for prohibited discrimination
if white jurors with the same traits were not challenged.1
6 2
158. See, e.g., Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987) (reasons for striking
black jurors were pretextual because not applied to white jurors), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
233 (1987); People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 168, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76
(1983) (disparate treatment of black and white jurors similarly situated "strongly sugges-
tive of bias"); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 2873
(1988); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J.
508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986) (prosecutor's failure to challenge white jurors who, by his own
criteria, ought to have been removed highly probative in determining whether prima fa-
cie case had been rebutted); see also United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Va.
1987) (Batson not violated because prosecutor's reasons were applied both to black and
white jurors), a'd, 847 F.2d 138 (1988).
159. 257 Ga. 325, 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987).
160. See id. at 328, 357 S.E.2d at 795.
161. See supra pp.21- 23. Both Chief Justice Ness and Justice Finney pointed out
this defect in the South Carolina Supreme Court's approach in their dissents in State v.
Howard, - S.C. _ 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), and State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362
S.E.2d 641 (1987).
162. Such a comparison also is consistent with the Supreme Court's Title VII deci-
sions previously discussed in this article and cited by the majority in Batson. See, e.g.,
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (plaintiff may
show pretext by demonstrating that similarly situated persons of different races were
treated differently). In McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court held
that the defendant's "criterion [must be] applied alike to members of all races." Id. at
804. Part of the South Carolina Supreme Court's difficulty in these cases may be due to
its comparative unfamiliarity with claims involving violations of the equal protection
clause and Title VII, issues that are addressed primarily in cases filed in the federal
courts. The shifting burdens of production and persuasion incorporated by the Batson
majority are not familiar legal tools to the state court.
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Additionally, other courts have considered two other factors
important in adjudicating Batson claims. These courts scrutinize
the prosecutor's articulated reason for striking a juror to deter-
mine if it is based upon evidence in the record and actually is
related to the case to be tried.6 3 Although the South Carolina
Supreme Court has indicated that whether the reason is sup-
ported by the record or related to the case to be tried, its deci-
sions are to the contrary."6 If the prosecutor cannot support the
strike on the basis of the record evidence or relate the supposed
reason to the case to be tried, then there is an increased likeli-
hood that the reason is merely pretextual and that the juror ac-
tually was excluded because of his or her race. These require-
ments necessarily mean that courts should be extremely
reluctant to accept general and vague reasons for striking a ju-
ror, such as the juror was "sullen," "distant," or "looked
mean."16 5 Other courts have recognized that such vague and gen-
eral assertions often indicate that the juror was excused, either
consciously or unconsciously, for racial reasons. 66
163. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987); see also People v. Hall,
35 Cal. 3d. 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983) (prosecutor must show specific
bias related to case to be tried); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987)
(Georgia Supreme Court found violation of Batson due to prosecutor's articulated reason
that the juror was challenged because he was a mason, when it was not demonstrated
how Masonic membership was related to the case). In Branch the Alabama Supreme
Court set forth several criteria for trial courts to utilize in assessing a prosecutor's justifi-
cation for his peremptory challenges: (1) the reasons given were not related to the facts
of the case; (2) the challenged juror was not asked meaningful questions; (3) white jurors
with similar characteristics were not challenged; (4) there was a disparate examination of
members of the venire; (5) the prosecutor used fewer than all his peremptory challenges;
and (6) the given explanation was based on a group trait where the trait is not specifi-
cally shown to apply to the challenged juror. See 526 So. 2d at 624. See also State v.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988).
164. See State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S.E.2d 641 (1987). In Martinez the
court accepted the prosecutor's articulated reasons even though the trial court deter-
mined essentially that the proffered reasons did not make sense. The reasons were ac-
cepted by the court because they were not "race related." Id. at 76 n.2, 362 S.E.2d at 643
n.2 (Ness, C.J., dissenting).
165. See State v. Edwards, No. 87-MO-425, mei. op. (S.C. Dec. 8, 1987) (affirmed
without opinion pursuant to Rule 23 of The Rules of the South Carolina Supreme Court)
(court rejected Batson challenge when prosecutor struck forty-three-year-old black fe-
male because she was elderly and another black juror because he looked mean).
166. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 725, 726 P.2d 102, 110, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 656, 664 (1986) (prosecutor's statement that juror was excused because of "some-
thing in her work" inadequate to sustain use of peremptory challenge); State v. Slappy,
522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988).
34
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss2/2
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Furthermore, other courts have recognized that the trial
court is obligated to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation care-
fully in order to determine if it is bona fide,' and the court
need not and should not accept any reason given by the prosecu-
tor at face value."6 8 In fact, in order to ensure that the mandate
of Batson is followed, the trial judge and the appellate courts
should conduct a probing inquiry into the prosecutor's explana-
tion.169 An excellent example of this more exacting scrutiny is
the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Ward v. State.
7 0
In Ward the State excused all potential black jurors. The prose-
cution explained its use of peremptory challenges by saying that
several jurors were struck because they were unemployed, un-
married, or both. The court reversed Ward's conviction and
death sentence. In so doing, it stated, "Actions sometimes speak
louder than words, and any prosecutor who uses all of his pe-
remptory challenges to strike black people better have some
good reasons available. . . .The best answer is for prosecutors
to put blacks on juries."'' Similarly, other courts have recog-
nized that a prosecutor's reasons should be given more exacting
scrutiny when racial issues are involved in the case.'72
In short, a proper adherence to Batson requires meaningful
rebuttal. To accomplish this goal, the trial judge should note all
the circumstances relevant to discrimination in the particular
case. Among other things, the trial court should keep a record of
167. See People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983);
Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22.
168. See Hall, 35 Cal. 3d at 169, 672 P.2d at 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 76; see also State
v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1987) (conviction reversed when the
prosecutor challenged only two Hispanic jurors in venire and merely denied doing so on
the basis of their race or national origin).
169. See Hall, 35 Cal. 3d at 168-69, 672 P.2d at 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 75. Thus, the
California Supreme Court requires the lower courts to make the determination of dis-
crimination based upon all the relevant circumstances, not merely upon the prosecutor's
statement of his reasons. Compare Hall, id. at 166, 672 P.2d at 856, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 73-
74 (prima facie case not rebutted) with People v. Clay, 153 Cal. App. 3d 433, 451-53, 200
Cal. Rptr. 269, 276-77 (1984) (prima facie case rebutted).
170. 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987).
171. Id. at 94, 733 S.W.2d at 731. The Ward court also acknowledged that the ra-
cially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors was widespread. Id.
172. See, e.g., Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71; Hale v. State,
480 So. 2d 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (conviction reversed in interracial case involving
white minor victim and black male defendant when black juror was excused to prevent
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the prosecutor's questions to prospective jurors if voir dire is
permitted, as well as a record of which jurors were retained and
which were excluded, with the reasons for those exclusions. Fur-
thermore, the trial court should determine whether the State's
reasons for excusing the minority jurors also were applied to
similarly situated white jurors. Finally, the trial judge should de-
termine if the prosecutor's articulated reasons make sense
standing alone and if they are both supported by the record and
related to the case to be tried.173 If the articulated reasons do
not satisfy these standards, then they should not be deemed ad-
equate to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination under
Batson.
7 4
This approach does not require much of the State. The Su-
preme Court recognized in Batson that peremptory challenges
have been used in the past and continue to be used in this coun-
try to exclude black persons from jury service.17 5 Typically, po-
tential black jurors have been excluded in cases involving black
defendants and white victims and witnesses, cross-racial eyewit-
ness identification, or other issues involving race. Prosecutors
frequently excuse black jurors in such cases because they assume
that black jurors are more likely to identify with a black defend-
ant or less likely to believe a white witness, whether it be the
victim, a police officer, or some other critical witness. 176 Even so,
it is precisely those types of generalizations and assumptions
about black persons and other minorities that are forbidden by
173. Defense counsel, of course, has the responsibility to bring the relevant informa-
tion to the trial court's attention. The Batson hearing is an adversarial proceeding, and
counsel must be given the opportunity to participate in the trial court's consideration of
the claim. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987) (error to hold
Batson hearing ex parte because of critical role of defense counsel in proceeding).
174. Some commentators have maintained that the reason given by the prosecutor
should affect the level of scrutiny given by trial and appellate courts. Thus, more vague
reasons, such as the juror's employment or looks, should be given more exacting scrutiny
than reasons that are more specific and verifiable. See Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremp-
tory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79
J. Cim. L, & CRIMONOLOGY 1 (1988).
175. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99; see also id. at 101 (White, J., concurring) ("practice
of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendants re-
mains widespread"); id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring) (recognizing the "shameful
practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries").
176. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK § 4.07 [1] [a] at 4-48 (2d ed. 1986) (be-
cause minorities presumed to have liberal attitudes toward criminal justice issues, prose-
cution generally does not want minority representation on jury).
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It also should be noted that the history underlying the
United States Supreme Court's antidiscrimination decisions par-
tially reveals why Batson troubles some courts. One result of so-
cial reform in the United States, especially in the last twenty-
five years, has been the stigmatization of blatant and overt racial
prejudice. As a result of this stigmatization, courts, even at times
the United States Supreme Court, have been reluctant to find
that a government body or official engaged in racial discrimina-
tion.17 7 Discrimination has become such a societal evil that
courts do not want to find it except in the clearest and most
blatant of circumstances. Therefore, there is a judicial reluc-
tance to label an official as a racist - either directly or indi-
rectly - without absolute proof of culpability.
178
The South Carolina Supreme Court, and other courts faced
with Batson claims, should confront this judicial reluctance
head-on. The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, al-
though purposeful racial discrimination in the legal sense, in
many cases is not invidious in the nonlegal sense of the term. In
other words, a prosecutor intentionally may use a strike to ex-
clude a black person because that individual is black but not
necessarily because of any racial animus. Rather, the juror is ex-
cused in order to obtain jurors the prosecutor believes will be
more favorable to the State's case. Thus, in the context of the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the courts should
recognize that a holding that a prosecutor violated Batson is not
equivalent to a holding that the prosecutor is a racist. Instead,
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges often arises
from generalizations about who may or may not be an impartial
juror in a particular case. Although trial lawyers often use such
generalizations,1 7 9 they no longer are acceptable under the equal
177. See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Su-
preme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1418 (1988).
178. See id. Professor Kennedy argues that this judicial reluctance is merely an-
other manifestation of the courts' concern for the feelings of whites rather than those of
blacks who have been the victims of discrimination.
179. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
[The peremptory challenge] is often exercised upon the "sudden impressions
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and
gestures of another," upon a juror's "habits and associations," or upon the feel-
ing that "the bare questioning [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke
a resentment." It is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought
1989]
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, the
courts should treat Batson claims as they would other constitu-
tional guarantees and not utilize an unstated and heightened
standard of review.
The racial discrimination involved in Batson admittedly is
more subtle than the wholesale exclusion of black jurors of the
last generation and, therefore, is more difficult to identify in any
particular case.1 o0 Nevertheless, it is equally real, equally perni-
cious, and equally unacceptable, and the South Carolina Su-
preme Court should take affirmative steps to eradicate it.1 81 The
court should recognize, as has the Florida Supreme Court, that:
discrimination within the judicial system is [the] most perni-
cious. It would seem equally self-evident that the appearance
of discrimination in court procedure is especially reprehensible,
since it is the complete antithesis of the court's reason for be-
ing - to insure equality of treatment and evenhanded justice.
Moreover, by giving official sanction to irrational prejudice,
courtroom bias only enflames bigotry in the society at large.
irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, na-
tionality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty....
Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as individuals for the purpose of
exercising peremptory challenges. Rather they are challenged in light of the
limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their group affilia-
tions, in the context of the case to be tried.
Id. at 220-21 (citations omitted).
180. In some cases, racial discrimination may be unconscious. Courts have recog-
nized that peremptories often are based on a prosecutor's "gut reaction" to the potential
juror. Hence, if a prosecutor feels uncomfortable with a particular juror, he will strike
him or her. Because most prosecutors are white, they naturally are more likely to feel
comfortable with persons most like themselves, other white jurors, and less comfortable
with black jurors. Thus, if unchecked, the peremptory challenge inherently accommo-
dates racism by sanctioning unexplained subjective decisions. See Serr & Maney, supra
note 174, at 2. It may well be that as more black persons are admitted to the bar and, as
a result, are employed as prosecutors, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
will decrease.
181. Discrimination in the State's use of its peremptory challenges is, in many ways,
more pernicious than other types of discrimination in either the criminal justice system
or even the jury selection process. This is so because it involves a face-to-face encounter
between the person discriminated against, the black juror challenged by the prosecution,
and the State. The black person excluded from the jury list is almost always unaware
that he has been the victim of discrimination. This is not true, however, for the black
juror challenged by the prosecution. The black juror who is struck because of race is a
victim of governmental discrimination in open court, in the presence of the community.
Consequently, the effects of this type of racial injustice are more pernicious. In many
respects, discrimination in the State's use of its peremptory challenges truly remains one
of the "badges and incidents of slavery." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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The need to protect against bias is particularly pressing in the
selection of a jury, first, because the parties before the court
are entitled to be judged by a fair crosssection of the commu-
nity, and second, because our citizens cannot be precluded im-
properly from jury service. Indeed, jury duty constitutes the
most direct way citizens participate in the application of our
laws.
182
The ultimate message of Batson is that diversity is the ge-
nius of the jury system. A jury comprised of persons from di-
verse racial and socio-economic backgrounds assures fairness
and impartiality because the jurors must share their experiences,
values, and beliefs. 183 A verdict obtained in a proceeding in
which members of a black defendant's race have been intention-
ally excluded is not only less reliable, but also ultimately results
in an erosion of the public's confidence in the system. Finally, if
the legal profession expects jurors to lay aside their prejudices
once they enter the jury box, then as a starting point, it is criti-
cal that trial lawyers and judges remove their own biases and
stereotypes from the jury selection process.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to demonstrate the problems in-
herent in the restrictive view of Batson set forth in recent deci-
sions of the South Carolina Supreme Court. The court's reluc-
tance in strictly enforcing the constitutional mandate of the
United States Supreme Court, while to a certain degree under-
standable, is unsound. Because the court's limited view of Bat-
son, for all practical purposes, has rendered the Supreme Court's
decision meaningless, it runs the risk of ultimately being re-
jected. This possibly could result in numerous reversals.
Furthermore, the court's opinions send the wrong messages
to prosecutors and trial judges of this state and, consequently,
inevitably will lead to more - rather than fewer - claims alleg-
182. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2873 (1988).
183. See Note, supra note 9. It is true, therefore, that in some cases a defendant's
peers will vote differently than nonpeers because of a greater understanding of the de-
fendant's attitudes and way of life. See A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CR1111-
NAL TRIALS § 2.2, at 64 (1984). Batson recognizes that this diversity is an asset, rather
than a liability, to our system of justice.
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ing that the State has exercised its strikes to exclude black per-
sons from jury service in criminal cases. Conversely, if the court
were to embrace Batson more warmly, it is likely that the dis-
criminatory use of the State's peremptory challenges would de-
crease. Prosecutors would exercise their strikes more carefully,
and trial judges would eliminate many problems at the outset.
The result of this more rigorous enforcement of Batson would be
fewer problems for the court reviewing cold appellate records in
an attempt to discern racial discrimination. Finally, this article
has taken issue with the court on a more fundamental level. Ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection exists. It no longer can be
tolerated, however, because it damages the integrity of the entire
criminal justice system: that is the fundamental teaching of Bat-
son. Despite the South Carolina Supreme Court's natural reluc-
tance to hold that any particular solicitor in any particular case
has discriminated against black persons in the use of his pe-
remptory challenges, the alternative is to perpetuate, rather
than eradicate, the use of stereotypes and generalizations in jury
selection. The South Carolina Supreme Court should take the
lead in ensuring that no citizen of this state is excluded on the
basis of his or her race from the jury selection process.
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